Introduction
Citizenship […] names a site at which our constitutive account of what we are supposed to be will become less plausible, and where the highly problematic character of what we think politics is and where it occurs will become increasingly pronounced. [...] 
[B]ut
there is no point in pushing at these limits […] without also pushing at the account of modern subjectivity which has been produced by, and is productive of, those limits. (Walker 1999, p.198) In 2004 the issue of citizenship became a heated topic of debate across the Republic of Ireland. This followed a proposal to modify, via referendum, the existing automatic constitutional entitlement to birthright citizenship. The existing automatic constitutional entitlement to birthright citizenship, inserted in 1998 as Article 2,  promotes an understanding of citizenship as tied to rights but also to duties and responsibilities (understood as 'connections') which individuals have to a particular state. It therefore emphasizes the need to qualify entitlement to citizenship accordingly. 4 The alternative perspective critiques the former as being based on narrow racialized understandings of Irishness and defends a more inclusive notion of citizenship by appealing to post-racial cosmopolitan imagery which is not dictated by a statist monopoly on understandings of modern political community and identity.
This framing of the question of the 'politics' of citizenship as a negotiation of preferences between bounded citizenship (particularism) and post-national citizenship (universalism) reflects dominant trends in international citizenship scholarship. Over the past three decades these have begun to focus increasingly on how the state constructs groups differently in society according to degrees of inclusion and exclusion (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989 , Lister 1997 , Goldberg 2002 . This has meant moving away, most notably, from focusing on the way the state acts upon individuals to that of how 'the state itself forms the political project' (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989, p.6 ). This scholarship is, however, still based on an understanding that subjectivity must continue to be discussed in relation to the state, as that which defines the parameters of 'political' community as against social community, economic community, etc.
In contrast to this, and as the opening quote suggests, R.B.J Walker's work emphasizes the link between politics and its constitutive subject. In so doing, he historicizes the notion of sovereign and autonomous subjectivity, and questions the supposed obviousness itself of taking the state as analytical category in its own right, juxtaposed with an autonomous sovereign form of 'being' which is then either included or excluded. The point is that Walker enters this debate (what he calls 'the citizenship debate' (Walker 1999, p.172) ) by contesting the assumption that subjectivity has to be defined vis-à-vis its relationship with the state. He points instead to the assumptions regarding autonomy and sovereignty which this assumes and (re)produces. His work therefore presents itself as a challenge to the belief that the existing framing of the debate on citizenship in 2004 completely exhausts our 'understandings of historical tendencies and […] judgments of normative possibilities' (ibid, p.171) as these relate to the question of the politics of citizenship.
Instead it suggests that the particular versus universal, inclusion versus exclusion lens through which citizenship is normally articulated, reflects important assumptions about what a politics of citizenship must look like due to its attachment to a specifically modern account of autonomous subjectivity (ibid). With this in mind I take Rob Walker's work (1999) Referendum. It also explores the dominant intellectual and theoretical explanations for these arguments. It discusses finally why and how these are normally articulated as two opposing models of citizenship. The aim of this section is to highlight the reliance of these interpretations on the notion of the individual (albeit often via a very deconstructed understanding) as the lowest unit of analysis who is understood in terms of their ability to hold rights always against the state. The second section then develops an analysis designed to problematize this framework. This is done using Rob
Walker's notion of the constitutive subject of citizenship. It is pointed out that this specifically problematizes the notion itself of individuality -not only in its own right as has been done already in critical citizenship scholarship via gendered and ethnic understandings of subjectivity -but specifically as that which is understood as connected to, but separate from, the (Irish) state.
The final section outlines what a reconceptualized concept of citizenship based on this problematized framework would look like It suggests that the notion of a constitutive subject of citizenship presents us with a different starting point from which to approach questions regarding the politics of citizenship in the Republic of Ireland, to that which is currently offered. This is a starting point which destabilizes the inevitability of the current framework which takes for granted that we must read citizenship via an understanding of subjectivity as autonomous and separate from the state and therefore in terms of inclusionary versus exclusionary models. Unlike the existing framework, I emphasize that the aim here is no longer to attempt to 'resolve' the question of citizenship in the Republic of Ireland post 2004 via understandings of a more inclusive Irish statist project. Instead the aim of this alternative framework, is that of providing the possibility of reconceiving of subjectivity in terms other than those (pre)determined by the sovereign autonomous boundaries of the Irish state.
These are terms which expressly mess with the clean lines which have been imposed on understandings that the relationship between politics (of citizenship) and subjectivity must be conceptualized in terms of identity (inside) versus difference (outside).
The 2004 Irish citizenship referendum debate
This section outlines the two sides of the debate as structured at the time of the Citizenship Referendum according to existing analysis. The point in doing so here is not to engage in yet another discussion as to whether in 2004 the proposed amendment to the constitution was based on a legitimate civic (sovereign) understanding of citizenship or, alternatively an ethnic (racist) understanding of citizenship as is currently focused on. Rather, as will become increasingly clear, the aim here is to begin to explore the manner in which both of these positions, as articulated here, leave unquestioned a modern concept of subjectivity which sits at the heart of this debate itself.
Sovereign statehood
On 10 March 2004 the Irish Government announced its plans to hold a referendum on the question of whether the existing universal constitutional right to birthright citizenship on the island of Ireland should be amended. A bill, which proposed that the following new section be added to Article 9 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (Irish Constitution, 1937) , was initiated in Dáil Éireann (lower house) several weeks later: Miller (1999, p.69) equates bounded citizenship with the republican understandings of citizenship as an active ideal wherein a specific political community is constructed around a bounded unit, understood as a finite single entity which is defined on the basis of shared characteristics.
Racial statehood
The argument against the removal of the constitutional entitlement to birthright citizenship As Kimberly Hutchings (1999) points out, normally the separation of the particular exclusivist and universal inclusivist models of citizenship, and the theories on which they draw, is seen to revolve around the manner in which one model sees morality and politics as only reconcilable within the nation-state, whereas the other argues that these can be bridged outside the nation-state as well. In this regard it is widely accepted that they do oppose each other. 9 However I argue in this paper that this opposition can be called into question by looking specifically at the ideal of subjectivity which underpins both these models in their analysis of the 2004
Citizenship Referendum. I use the word 'ideal' here to emphasize that as well as an attempt to capture how citizenship does work, there is also a normative assumption common to both models regarding how citizenship must work.
Theoretical basis for existing analysis of 2004 citizenship referendum
Prior to 'political', inclusion and exclusion in relation to this membership; the latter which we are told is always determined by the boundaries of the subnational, national or supra national state (ibid). What this indicates is that the emphasis on sub-national (local) and supra-national (global) perspectives of citizenship on one hand and the deconstructed notion of individuality on the other, does not undermine an understanding of the inter-connected, but ultimately autonomous, relationship between the statist realm where politics is understood to be taking place and, people's interaction in that. This is to point out here that despite moving away from understanding citizenship as something which is exclusively 'bestowed by the state' (Gaventa 2005, p.xii) , and towards an understanding of it as something which is constructed in terms of other realms, there remains an emphasis in this literature on the need to always focus in the last instance on how citizenship (and hence subjectivity) is defined vis-à-vis the state (political realm) as that which delineates the boundaries of these other realms. The result is that the notion of autonomous sovereign beings, which exist in the last instance in relation to the state and can be included and excluded, is retained.
Emphasizing the inclusive/exclusive citizenship framework within which dominant international citizenship studies literature operates is not an attempt here to ignore how the debates within this framework can also be broken down along the lines of liberal, communitarian, radical and cosmopolitan theories (on this see Delanty, 2000) . Similarly, it is not to ignore Robin Cohen's comments (2006, p.89-109 ) regarding a notable effort elsewhere within this literature to also consider a compromise to the exclusionary focused racial theories of the state in more inclusively focused cosmopolitan alternatives. It is rather to draw attention to the manner in which the framework within which all these theories operate is one which is based on the overall assumption of the need to consider how membership of a fluid, universal humanity can be reconciled with membership of a particular and bounded community. In response to this question, I would point out that despite moving from emphasizing exclusive and inclusive models of citizenship as polar opposites, to that of exploring how these models can be interwoven within certain concepts, the framework which is presented here by those such as Fanning or Cohen still presents the politics of citizenship as that which must be defined in terms of the relationship between autonomous persons, or groups of autonomous persons (the universal), and the state (the particular). This indicates that these more 'reasonable' options are not more reasonable in terms of an infinite range of possibilities. Rather, they are simply more reasonable in light of the existing 'spectrum of interpretive dispositions' (Doty 1993, p.298 ) that created the 'reality' that gave rise to a range of limited possibilities through which the politics of citizenship could be debated in the first place.
To conclude, the point being made here is that existing analysis of the 2004
Citizenship Referendum mirrors dominant trends in international critical citizenship scholarship by always positing the question of the politics of citizenship in terms of the relationship between subjectivity and the state. It accordingly both reflects and reinforces a certain ideal that the character and location of modern 'political' identity must be located in the claims of state sovereignty (Walker, 1995, p.12) . This places an emphasis on the institution of the state and divides responses into either those that justify or those that critique the patterns of exclusion which can be traced through it.
Despite a differing of opinion regarding the degree of inclusive-ness or exclusive-ness of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, the point is that the lowest unit of analysis always remains the individual (albeit a thoroughly deconstructed notion thereof) who is understood in terms of their ability to hold rights against the state.
Challenging the citizenship debate
I will now consider how Rob Walker's notion of the constitutive subject of citizenship poses a challenge to the existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum. As I will discuss, his work specifically questions the emphasis in this type of analysis (which is then used as a departure point to plot all subsequent trajectories) on the notion of the state (or sub category thereof) and (deconstructed) individual, as analytical categories in their own right. Walker instead highlights the manner in which the relationship between citizenship and the modern sovereign territorial state is a historically specific resolution of the question of politics (via diversity and unity) which is extremely significant but not 'true' (timeless) beyond its ability to facilitate a modern expression of political identity. The result is to force us to think about dominant concepts of citizenship as being tied to a particular concept of subjectivity as opposed to allowing us to presume that subjectivity has always been theorized via a framework through which a (subjective) self is theorized as sometimes included, sometimes excluded, (and often both) from the (natural) world of states and societies.
This intimates that another way of thinking about the 2004 Citizenship Referendum might be possible, albeit extremely difficult to imagine.
Theorizing modern subjectivity
Unlike Walker (1999) specifically explores this change in how lines were drawn in early-modern Europe in terms of how our understanding of citizenship shifted at this point: from being based in a theologically legitimizing feudal status, defined in terms of the status of others above and below (hierarchical exclusion), to that of a self-legitimizing status, defined in terms of membership of a territorial community (spatial exclusion). Most importantly here, Walker points out that in the shift from medieval hierarchies to modern autonomies, a particular understanding of subjectivity -as citizen-subject who is 'at once multiple, specific, individual, and (at least potentially) universal, human, rational' (ibid, p.196) -also became crucial to our understanding of how our political options should be resolved. Walker points out, is that most of the alternatives offered -whether these emphasize a specific theory of cosmopolitanism, or merely promote greater inclusion -are themselves already assumed in the prior formulation of the problem as one of particularism and exclusion defined according to the state as analytical category in its own right. The implication here is that state has become both problem and solution regarding questions about the possibilities for political life and that this framing makes the question of citizenship itself when referred back to these statist terms, a 'crucial but irresolvable problem' (ibid, p.173). As Vaughan-Williams (2007, p.115) points out, this is because it is the state which defines the boundaries of exclusion which are then used to (re)define who needs to be 'included' in the state; 'it is precisely the state that produces the foreigner, immigrant, exiled, deported or stateless person in need of greater levels of universal hospitality in the first place'.
In an attempt therefore to separate out understandings of what political life is supposed to be, from understandings of how the modern polis has become inherent in the natural resolution of this question, Walker suggests that citizenship should be (re)conceived not only in relation to where we draw the boundaries of the state or those of the individual but also in relation to how we take for granted the sovereign autonomous 'we' which supposedly exists separate from the boundaries of the state in the first place. He asks us, in other words, to think about citizenship as being tied to a particular notion of subjectivity rather than assuming that subjectivity is naturally autonomous and sovereign. I suggest here that Walker's notion of a constitutive subject of politics (which he refers to as the modern subject) builds on the Foucauldian idea that there is a specific 'kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries' (Foucault 1982, p.216) . 11 Walker specifically links this idea to our current understanding of politics as located in claims to state sovereignty (Walker 1995, p.12) . (Fanning 2007 (Fanning , 2008 . Similarly the notion of a gender or ethnic neutral self has been thoroughly challenged in these accounts. There is, however, little evidence that the understanding of the sovereign autonomous 'we' which supposedly exists separate from the boundaries of the state to which Walker draws our attention, has been anything more than merely assumed. Instead, the evidence suggests that there is a relatively unproblematic retention in these existing accounts in the last instance of a claim to the original dualism of modern subjectivity which Walker identifies -between 'citizen' (as particular identity defined in terms of the Irish state) and 'Man' (as universal identity defined in terms of humanity). 12 This is despite the challenge which the presence of the Irish citizen/non-citizen child of 
Problematizing modern subjectivity
References by Walker to a specifically modern account of subjectivity which is tied to our understanding of what politics is and must be, can be read as shifting the focus in debates on citizenship with regard to how subjectivity is conceptualized. Instead of an emphasis on coherent categories of subject such as 'foreigner', 'Black', 'immigrant', 'African woman' as in existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, the assumptions underlying the coherency of these subjectivities is questioned. This is done via an exploration of the appeals themselves to sovereign and autonomous subjectivity (as that which can be included or excluded), upon which a (modern) notion of subjectivity is based. The word coherency is used here to capture a dependency on 'the lines of analysis that we rely on "to make sense" of our established political categories' (Walker 1999, p.198) . The alternative proposed is not 'incoherency' therefore but rather that of 'making strange' (Judith Butler, 2004) 14 the lines which we have come to take so much for granted, which tell us 'how universality and diversity must be related' (Walker 2003, p.283) . As opposed to starting with a framework wherein lines are (always already) drawn between a (subjective) self and an (objective) world of states, as is done in existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum, Walker intimates at a different framework here which starts from the question specifically of how understandings of being have been required in the last instance to be articulated in terms of a coherent unified entity which can be pointed to as 'included' or 'excluded', as 'abusing' or as 'not abusing'.
As Edkins and Pin-Fat (1999) discuss in detail elsewhere, this is to ask us to consider how a particular symbolic or social order is facilitated through an inscription of sovereign subjectivity as that which defines 'reality' in terms of modern politics, as opposed to presuming that modern politics (a sovereign political order and a sovereign autonomous subject) is the only possible political reality. Walker's work essentially calls for a historicizing of the basis by which the question of 'being' has been posed specifically in terms of, and by way of, a particular framing of subjectivity (Irishness 
Citizenship 'after' the modern subject
In existing analysis of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum the emphasis on 'privileging the voices of the racialised' (Lentin 2004a, p.6 ) reveals that there is an assumption that 'they' can be brought 'inside' relations of power to counteract exclusive understandings of community with more inclusive ones. This takes for granted a coherency; a tangible inside which opposes itself to a tangible outside (if only in the last instance). It assumes a resolvability within spatially defined communities along the lines of gender, race, ethnicity and culture. In other words, although the boundaries of this community (understandings of 'where' the lines of the (Irish) state should be drawn) are no longer being taken for granted in critical explorations of the referendum, the location of (modern) political identity (understandings of 'how' it is necessary to think about borders as absolute space between inclusion and exclusion) is still bound to the inscription of sovereign subjectivity. Yet citizenship is a site which marks the highly problematic nature of what and where politics occurs -as the debate about Irish citizen children born to non-national parents make clear. Citizenship asks difficult questions about who and how we understand ourselves to be and confirms that the drawing of these lines is always much more complex than the eventual borders which emerge between 'us' and 'them' and between 'racialized' and 'nonracialized', would suggest. Irish citizen children born to non-national parents straddle several positions at once. They do so as agents and therefore as subjects. Their subjectivity cannot be defined in terms of singular agency because they are both agents as Irish citizens who belong and also deprived of agency as people who can be deported because they do not belong. identify an important difference in recent attempts to retheorize the political through the notion of 'subjectivity' which is instructive here in considering what is at stake in Walker's work. This is the difference which they identify between attempts which have been made to simply question the notion of the subject as the authentic source of action of meaning, and attempts which have been made to reconceptualize the subject by thinking of it in a new displaced or decentred position. Edkins and Pin-Fat point out that in the latter attempts the emphasis is on a subject without any fixed, essential or permanent identity. Here, the subject is left 'not only fragmented but irretrievably split' (ibid, p.1) and it calls the idea itself of sovereignty and its linearities (the self versus the other, inside versus outside) into question. The result is an emphasis on the possibility of a politics based upon the ambivalence of subjectivity as an accumulation of encounters and synthesis which cannot be defined in terms of particular groupings or levels of inclusion and exclusion in an overarching sovereign statist project.
The Politics of Sovereign Statehood
In to 'include' -to think of subjectivity in sovereign autonomous entities -presupposes that 'exclusion' must be defined according to the state. There is no space to question the basis of the assumption that the Irish state is the proper legitimate authority in this regard.
Political (im)possibilities
Moving deliberately away from defining sovereignty and the possibility of politics in terms first and foremost of the state, is to refuse a specifically modern form of understanding ourselves as 'being' (Dillon 1999 as a starting point to try to understand how conceptions of subjectivity remain embedded in statist understandings of political community, the autonomy of these categories and the manner in which they derive their meaning from the state as analytical category du jour becomes that which needs to be explained.
The strategy offered here to rethink subjectivity is derived from the work of we are left with then, as Jabri (2009, p.227 (Kristeva 1991, p.170) , the metaphysics of presence that sovereignty brings which is required to speak these lines, is displaced by 'an ontological rift that an absence of any sovereignty suggests' (Edkins and Pin-Fat 1999, p.15) . This is to leave the reader with an alterative understanding of 'being' as divided in its reliance on the notion of selves which implicates oppositional otherness, rather than an understanding of 'being' as divided in terms of 'the self' which can 'being' is no longer a metaphysics of presence vis-à-vis the state (sovereignty) but an ontology of plurality and hybridity.
As Vicki Squire (2009) 15 The argument made here is that this allows for the possibility of a politics of citizenship that specifically recognizes the incompleteness of the subject and its fragmented being before lines are drawn along hierarchies of class, status, social order and territorial place and it can be authoritatively declared that 'you' have been constructed as belonging there, 'we' have been constructed as belonging here. This is to move away from the question of what 'makes sense' as to rethink citizenship without the modern subject is precisely not to do so. It is rather to think contemporary politics in terms of how we might 'exceed the discursive space made available by an apparent binary but in effect mutually constitutive choice between state/nation/republic and some half-remembered, half-forgotten cosmopolis' (Walker 1999, p.198) . The alternative lines of analysis advocated in this paper will not provide an answer to the politics of citizenship in the Republic of Ireland in 2004 and since, nor elsewhere. What they do offer however is indications of how we might theorize an(Other) starting point for approaching the question of how the 'politics' of citizenship itself could be articulated. This is one which tries not to fix possible responses according to the lines inscribed by modern subjectivities but which actively encourages engagement with the patterns of continuity and diversity that eschew the clear, clean lines which tell us who we are and, where the (legitimate) boundaries of political community (must) lie.
Conclusion
In keeping with the assumption that the state is the site of proper authority, existing Sara Salih (2004, p.326) argues that 'making the ordinary world seem strange (rather than unintelligible) constitutes a move towards a more capacious understanding of otherness'. Our task, however, she explains, is not to emancipate ourselves from existing understandings of who we are but to rather to 'replay and recite them in order to reveal the[ir] instabilit[ies]' (ibid). Walker's work as applied here should not therefore be taken to imply that we can move 'beyond' the state, nor beyond a modern conception of subjectivity as sovereign and autonomous. As
Foucault pointed out, 'the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days'
is not to liberate ourselves from the state but from 'the type of individualization which is linked to the state' (Foucault 1982, p.216) . What is proposed is rather the refusal of a certain kind of subjectivity which has monopolized our understanding of ourselves as beings which exist vis-à-vis our relationship with the state, as the only kind of subjectivity. What has been emphasized here is our need to consider how ordinary concepts such as 'foreignness' do not only confirm existing assumptions regarding marginalization but can be repeated and replayed to reveal instabilities in existing understandings about where 'the margins' are located, how they are negotiated and what they imply.
Imagining a politics 'beyond the horizons of a sovereign space' where the completeness of the subject is constantly reaffirmed, is no easy task (Walker 1999, p.175 ). Yet, it is evident that attempts are being made to engage with this possibility in the context of the question of citizenship and belonging on the island of Ireland.
Calls have, for example, been made for a counter history of the story of Ireland and its multiple peoples and diasporas, which moves away from the tribal narrative of a core nation of 'old' Celtic and successive invasions of 'new' Irish (MacÉínri 2009) . This is to call for imaginations of political horizons which take account of, rather than neutralize, the multiple and overlapping encounters and syntheses which result from uneven combinations and ambiguous margins. It is suggested here that the notion of foreignness as employed by Julia Kristeva helps us consider how we might begin to imagine these alternative political horizons 'that ask after the silences, the margins, the excluded' (Masters 2009, p.124) rather than the sovereign and the coherent. 9 For an illustration of this opposition, see chapters written as a debate between 'cosmopolitan' and 'bounded' citizenship by Miller, D. and Linklater, A. (1999) 10 For notable exceptions among citizenship scholarship where the emphasis is not primarily on the state and thereby on defining citizenship in terms of an understanding of power which is centralized and thus imposed upon subjects, but rather where citizenship is presented as a process of subject formation, see for example Ong (1999) , Bigo and Guild (2005) , and Hindess (2002 and . 11 The point here is not to draw too many parallels between Foucault's and Walker's work beyond highlighting that both seek to emphasize that sovereignty needs to be understood, in the words of Michael Dillon, as 'idiomatic' (Dillon 2004, p.42) .
12 It should be noted that while a gendered exploration of the 2004 Irish Citizenship Referendum has been undertaken and this has resulted in a renewed focus on this relationship in terms of citizen (ship) and 'Woman' (rather than 'Man'), the dualism itself between particularism and universalism which
Walker associates with modern subjectivity, has been retained. See, for example, Lentin, R. and Luibhéid, E. (2004) 13 In a 1990, the Supreme Court ruled that Miriam Fajujonu (an Irish citizen child born to non-national parents who themselves were undocumented) was permitted to stay in Ireland with the 'care, protection and society' of her parents (Fajujonu v. Minister for Justice 1990). As a result of this ruling, it a precedent was set which allowed Irish citizen children born to non-national parents to apply to remain in Ireland on these same terms. This right was never absolute however and in 2003, in another Supreme
Court case it was ruled that the right of a child born to non-national parents (who did not have residency rights themselves) to stay in Ireland could be superseded by the importance of the integrity of
